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THE PRUDENT PEACE: LAW AS FOREIGN POLICY. By John A. Per-
kins. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. xvi, 246. 
$22. 
The peaceful resolution of international conflicts is a subject of increas-
ing concern in this nuclear age. 1 John Perkins' The Prudent Peace ad-
dresses this vitally important issue by bridging the gap between 
international law and international politics.2 Drawing from both interna-
tional law and political realism,3 Perkins proposes a method of conflict res-
olution requiring equal treatment of nations and third-party binding 
adjudication of intractable disputes. Perkins argues that the United States' 
unilateral subscription to such an international legal system would increase 
both the effectiveness of American foreign policy and the likelihood of ob-
taining peaceful settlements of international disputes. 
Part one of the Prudent Peace examines the role oflaw in foreign affairs. 
Perkins initially sets forth three essential elements of a legal system 
designed to resolve international conflicts. He argues that the system must 
provide for binding third-party adjudication and that it must produce rules 
that reflect the political realities of the time4 and that apply equally to all 
nations (p. 4). 
With these legal requirements established, Perkins discusses the interac-
tion of international law and "the realities of foreign policy" (p. 15). Per-
kins believes that international law reacts to the international behavior of 
nations. He maintains that actions today in disregard of international law 
will lead to a tightening of the rule of law that will make future infractions 
harder to justify. In support of this contention, he notes that the United 
States' repeated intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American coun-
tries led the Monroe Doctrine to evolve into a general legal principle of 
nonintervention (pp. 7-150). 
Perkins next argues that the international law is, and should be, a major 
consideration of American foreign policy. American adherence to emerging 
principles of law will serve the United States' self-interest, whereas actions 
in disregard of the law will result in misfortune. Perkins claims, for exam-
ple, that the illegality of the Bay of Pigs operation hampered its success; it 
prevented the United States from effectively defending or supporting the 
invasion. In contrast, Perkins asserts that the legal underpinnings of the 
I. See, e.g., Sorenson, Law: The Most Powerful Alternative to War, 4 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 
13 (1980). 
2. For a discussion of the differences between international law and international politics, 
see Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and 
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 193 (1980). 
3. Political realists believe foreign policy should be decided on purely practical grounds, 
and that law has very little, if any, role in foreign policy. See generally G. KENNAN, AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1951); Morgenthau, Diplomacy, 55 YALE L.J. 1067, 1078-80 
(1946). 
4. For example, this legal system when confronted with a Persian Gulf crisis would recog-
nize the necessity of an adequate flow of oil to the West. 
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United States' response to the Cuban Missile Crisis added legitimacy to 
American actions and may have provided the margin of success (pp. 33-35). 
Perkins' historical treatment of this subject is not entirely convincing. 
His discussion of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
relation to the doctrine of nonintervention is narrowly focused and fails to 
consider the political and military realities that affected the outcome of each 
event. Even more telling, Perkins' argument for American adherence to the 
law of nonintervention fails to explain the United States' successful "ille-
gal" intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. 
Perkins contends that America must accept a total commitment to inter-
national law to obtain its full benefits. Perkins discusses America's half-
hearted commitment to law during the Vietnam war to illustrate his point. 
American intervention under the guise of defending South Vietnam's right 
to self-determination rang hollow when accompanied with America's re-
fusal to adjudicate the Vietnamese right of self-determination:Perkins con-
tends that this left the United States in a vulnerable legal position and 
accordingly diminished support for the war effort back home (pp. 40-46). 
Although Perkins' theory may have some validity, his use of Vietnam as 
an example weakens his case. His conclusion that America's weak legal 
foundation for its involvement in Vietnam was the root of discontent at 
home overstates his case and fails to recognize domestic sources of discon-
tent. As with his previous use of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of 
Pig_s fiasco, Perkins has stretched historical evidence to prove his point. 
The use of a legal system to resolve international conflict is, in Perkins' 
view, dependent on a military balance of power. The balance of power pre-
vents one nation from dominating another and is therefore a prerequisite to 
an effective system of international law. Conversely, Perkins argues the 
balance of power is dependent on international law; the right of self-deter-
mination justifies intervention to prevent the world's precarious power bal-
ance from being forcibly changed. If the balance of power drastically shifts 
and threatens a nation's survival, Perkins recognizes that that nation may 
and should legally act to protect its legitimate self interests. 
Part one of The Prudent Peace concludes with the argument that an 
effective international legal system must recognize principles of emerging 
law.: Perkins comments that formal international legal agreements evolve 
slowly and often fail to reflect present concepts of justice. The recognition 
of emerging principles of law will narrow this gap and will insure that the 
law coincides with modem concepts of justice (pp. 49-54). 
The second part of The Prudent Peace discusses these principles of 
emerging law; specifically Perkins considers the issues of self-determina-
tion, nonintervention, regional security zones, international rights in strate-
gic areas, and access to resources. Perkins emphasizes that emerging law 
should address practical problems and propose practical solutions. 
In the third and final part of the book, Perkins advocates adherence to a 
system of law in foreign policy that offers a strategy for the resolution of 
S. Perkins defines these as "those principles commanding international respect although 
not yet established as binding law, that are consistent with the charter of the United Nations 
and are of a character, merit, and acceptability that make them appropriate for recognition as 
law." P. S4. 
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conflict. The cornerstone of this strategy is a system of impartial claims 
adjudication. This adjudicative process must provide nations with a rea-
sonable alternative to the use of force. Therefore, it should seek to resolve 
conflicts on the basis of principles that reflect the "felt necessities of the 
time" and apply equally to all (p. 144). These principles would not be stag-
nant, but instead would be formed during the process of conflict resolution 
(pp. 143-44). 
Perkins proposes the formation of a legal tribunal to resolve interna-
tional disputes. He suggests that the International Court of Justice appoint 
a five-member tribunal, and argues that this tribunal should have jurisdic-
tion over all necessary parties willing to adjudicate their claims and should 
be the final judge of all substantive issues; the I.C.J. should review only 
procedural questions. While Perkins advocates that the tribunal be pro-
vided extensive powers of equitable relief, he believes that it should not 
control a nation's internal affairs (pp. 149-51). 
Perkins argues that the United States should offer to submit disputes to 
this tribunal (pp. 137-43), believing that the commitment of the United 
States to international law will increase support for American policies at 
home and abroad. In support of his position, he notes that if the other party 
refuses to adjudicate the dispute or to abide by the tribunal's decision, the 
United States would reserve the right to protect its national interest by 
whatever means necessary. 
While this is an appealing argument, it glosses over some practical con-
siderations. First, the tribunal would base its decision on "emerging princi-
ples oflaw," even though these principles have not been clearly established. 
By committing itself to a legal system without a declared set of laws, the 
United States would run a substantial risk of receiving an adverse judg-
ment. Second, the tribunal would be unable to enforce its judgment, 
though presumably a party favored by the tribunal's judgment could legally 
resort to force to effectuate that judgment. 
Despite the shortcomings of this book, it does make a useful contribu-
tion to the existing international law literature. Perkins joins others in rec-
ognizing the importance of law within the sphere of international relations 
and proposing the peaceful resolution of issues before an international tri-
bunal. Perkins contributes to the existing literature in two primary ways. 
First, he proposes that the United States unilaterally agree to submit its 
intractable disputes to an impartial international judicial body. This offer 
is, of course, dependent on the other party consenting to the tribunal's juris-
diction and agreeing to abide by the judgment. Second, he recognizes the 
importance of emerging principles of law and seeks to define these princi-
ples and incorporate them within the conflict resolution process. The Pru-
dent Peace seeks to open the door for further discussions of peaceful 
alternatives for the resolution of international disputes. It deserves serious 
consideration. 
